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THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL-
REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT*
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD**
I. INTRODUCrION
A recent study of the Solicitor General's office-dealing with my
predecessors over the past twenty-five years-objected that on too many
issues the Solicitor General had seen his role as an advocate for the in-
terests of the government and its agencies rather than as a "statesman.' 1
Now, it is true that lawyers in the Office of the Solicitor General, like
diplomats, do wear striped trousers when they appear in Court. Whether
they should undertake otherwise to emulate statesmen is a question
which must always concern the lawyer who holds the office of Solicitor
General, and I propose to give some consideration to it in this lecture.
By way of introduction, I may say that statesmanship does not require
complete detachment from loyalty to one's government, nor neutrality
about the resolution of a dispute. Better indicia of statesmanship may be
found, I think, in an ability and a willingness to recognize the larger in-
terests at stake, interests which may warrant conceding a momentary
advantage that would ultimately distort or retard the achievement of a
greater goal. While Solicitors General have, I think, sought with re-
markable consistency to take statesman-like positions on legal matters
within their sphere, it seems unwise to lose sight of the reality that a
Solicitor General is not an ombudsman with a roving commission to do
justice as he sees it. He is a lawyer, though with special responsibilities,
who must render conscientious representation to his client's interests.
The unique opportunity to be statesman-like while still being a lawyer
comes from the recognition that our immediate client, the United States
government and its agencies, owes responsibility to all the people of
*This speech was delivered by the honorable Erwin N. Griswold at the
Earl F. Nelson Lecture on March 14, 1969.
**Solicitor General of the United States; formerly Dean of the Harvard
Law School.
1. Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A
Quarter-Century of Advocacy, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 481, 514 (1968).
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this Nation, who have determined that they will live under a constitutional
regime where the Rule of Law binds all. With this perspective, it some-
times develops that the particular case which is pending before the Supreme
Court may have aspects or possible repercussions which must be fitted
into a larger mosaic. As counsel for the United States before the Supreme
Court, it is inevitably the Solicitor General's function to consider not only
the immediate case, but also the collateral consequences of the position he
may take in presenting it.
With rare exceptions, the conduct of litigation in which the United
States, or any of its agencies or officials are involved is by law reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General. 2 And subject to his general supervision, and pursuant to statu-
tory provision,3 the Attorney General has assigned to the Solicitor General
the responsibility to handle all of the government's litigation before the
Supreme Court.4 Thus the Solicitor General has a steady grist of cases, and
with them the responsibility to present them to the Court with the argu-
ments and in the light which will best serve the overall interests of the
United States, and the sound growth and development of the law inso-
far as it inevitably develops through judicial decisions.
In actual practice, there is rarely a conflict between the position sought
to be advanced in a particular case and the larger interests of the govern-
ment. Two propositions that are basic to our system serve to ensure that
control over the government's litigation does not transform the Depart-
ment of Justice into a super-agency ratifying or vetoing determinations
made by other departments or agencies: the first is the recognition that
Congress has committed elsewhere the primary responsibility for most of
the policy decisions which steer the engine of government; and the second
is the understanding that our judicial system presupposes that the clash
of arguments presented by professional adversaries is the most reliable
process for determining the legality of any activity. Although I might be
challenged on this by the law officers of some of the administrative agencies
or other executive departments, I think that Solicitors General have been
careful as well as thoughtful in the exercise of their authority to make
the critical determination of what the legal position of the United States
government will be-even though it is occasionally exercised in its ultimate
form in the confession of error.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1964).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1964).
4. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1969).
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Any Solicitor General is inevitably aware that he is basically an advo-
cate. Within wide limits it is not for him to decide the cases which are be-
fore the Court-that is for the Court. But he is also aware that the office
involves some incidents of statesmanship. The origins of the Office, its
official responsibilities, and the obvious differences from private law offices,
all reflect this unusual status. It is to these factors that I would like to turn
now.
II. HisTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
One of the great-and often self-effacing-agencies of our government
is the Department of Justice, staffed by hundreds of lawyers, with offices
not only in Washington, but all over the country, to serve as the govern-
ment's advisers and courtroom'representatives. But it has not always been
that way. Though the first Congress provided for an Attorney General in
1789, he was given no professional staff and the post lacked the luster of
some of the other offices now regarded as cabinet positions. The govern-
ment's legal problems in the early days of the Republic were neither ex-
tensive nor, often, challenging. Indeed, in 1801, Theophilus Parson of
Massachusetts, nominated to be Attorney General and confirmed for the
post by the Senate, declined to accept the office. And in 1864, Joseph Holt
of Kentucky refused to accept President Lincoln's nomination to serve
as Attorney General.
While the government's legal problems were expanding, however, the
Attorney General had neither the authority nor the staff to manage them.
The law officers of the various departments for the most part conducted
their own legal affairs, and not until 1859 did Congress provide for an
assistant to the Attorney General to aid in handling those matters within
the Attorney General's jurisdiction.
In the mid-19th century, there developed a great increase in the
number of legal issues arising from the governance of a Nation with ex-
panding frontiers and responsibilities. This burgeoning legal business out-
distanced the capacity either of the Attorney General or of other govern-
ment lawyers to handle, and it became necessary in many cases to appoint
private counsel to conduct the government's litigation. Experience showed
that this resulted in loss of control over the government's legal positions,
and it also proved to be very expensive.
Or so Congress believed. Looking for ways to make the government
more efficient in the post-Civil War period, the Joint Committee on Re-
1969]
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trenchment concluded that great savings could be achieved, with the collat-
eral advantage of securing uniformity of position, by creating a Department
of Justice, to be headed by the Attorney General, and assigning to it the
general responsibility for managing the government's litigation. It was
at this time in 1870, nearly a hundred years ago, as part of that "measure
of economy,"5 that Congress determined that henceforth there should be
"an officer learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in the per-
formance of his duties, to be called the solicitor general * * *.,6
Needless to say, it is gratifying to me that Congress has retained the
insistence that in selecting a Solicitor General, the President should choose
a man "learned in the law."7 This is not required even for judges, and
there are few, if any, other federal offices which have such an accolade.
As originally conceived by Congress, the Solicitor General was to be
capable of conducting the government's evolving legal affairs wherever
they might have been in suit. The sponsor of the bill which created the
office thus explained:
We propose to have a man of sufficient learning, ability, and
experience that he can be sent to New Orleans or to New York, or
into every court wherever the Government has any interest in liti-
gation, and there present the case of the United States as it should
be presented.S
At least insofar as my thirty-three predecessors are concerned, I think
remarkable care has been taken to achieve the Congressional goal that the
"case of the United States" should be presented "as it should be presented."
That, I suppose, can serve as the text for my remarks tonight.
III. FuNriONS AND RESPONSIBILrrs
When I was just out of law school, I had the privilege of serving
under three Solicitors General, and this has, I think, given me a per-
spective that I otherwise might not have had. Another consequence of this
prior tour is the vivid realization of how disparate the government's legal
interests have become, and how staggering is the volume and variety of
questions the Supreme Court, in this era, is called upon to consider.
Before illustrating these points, I should say a word about the precise
5. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3038 (1870); see also, Id. at 3065; Id.
at 4490.
6. Act of June 22, 1870, § 2, 16 STAT. 162.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1964).
8. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 8035 (1870) (Cong. Jenckes).
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functions now entrusted to the Solicitor General. The statute providing
for the position states rather flatly that the Solicitor General is to assist
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.9 As you are no
doubt aware, the Attorney General has in turn assigned to the Solicitor
General the responsibility for conducting and supervising "all Supreme
Court cases" in which the government is interested?10 Two other duties
are specifically entrusted to the Solicitor General, duties whose import,
surprisingly, the Bar in general, and even lawyers involved in government
litigation, do not appreciate. The Solicitor General must pass upon every
case in which a decision is rendered in any court against the government,
to determine whether or not to authorize an appeal to some higher court.1 '
While some of these matters involve the question whether to seek re-
view in the Supreme Court-the phase of our work most generally recog-
nized-by far the greater volume consists of cases which the government
has lost in a district court; the Solicitor General must then decide whether
the decision should be appealed to a court of appeals. In addition, the
determination whether to file a brief amicus curiae in any appellate court,
and if so what position to adopt, is committed to the Solicitor General. 12
The Solicitor General's office is staffed by ten lawyers-three Deputy
Solicitors General and seven Assistants to the Solicitor General. During the
most recent full Term of the Supreme Court, the Office handled 1274
different Supreme Court cases, some 36 per cent of all those on the Court's
docket for the October 1967 Term.'8 This number included 38 certiorari
petitions filed by the government, and amicus support for 17 others; it also
included 887 cases in which the government appeared as the respondent,
either to oppose certiorari or to suggest some other disposition, and twelve
in which we appeared as amicus to oppose certiorari.' 4 The government
in that period also filed eleven appeals to the Supreme Court, and sup-
ported four others, while in fifty cases we appeared either as appellee or as
amicus on behalf of the appellee.' 5 We also participated in three cases in
that most unusual category, the Court's original docket.'6
9. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1964).
10. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1969).
11. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1969).
12. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (1969).
13. 1968 Ar'y GEN. ANN. REP., Table VIII 98.
14. Id., Table IX 99.
15. Id. at 100.
16. Id. at 101. [The totals given in this specific breakdown do not coincide
with the total number of cases on the docket in which the government participated,
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One may say, without being charged with overstatement, that these
figures are indeed formidable-exceeded only by the Court's own caseload,
which, of course, includes the additional "non-government" cases.
Even these statistics, however, do not tell the full quantitative story of
the Office's caseload. In addition to the cases in which we actually partici-
pated before the Supreme Court, it was necessary to consider 343 cases
in which we determined not to petition for certiorari and 28 cases in
which a direct appeal was not taken. And added to these are the 892 cases
in which the Solicitor General was called upon to consider whether to
authorize taking a case to one of the courts of appeals. It may surprise some
members of the Bar to know that in less than one third of the cases
lost by the government in the district court was an appeal to the courts of
appeals authorized-264 cases out of 892.
If you total these various figures you will find that well over 2000
different matters were passed upon by the Office of the Solicitor General
in the last fiscal year. Not all of them demand the same amount of delib-
eration, of course, and what would be a literally impossible task for me and
my staff becomes practicable only as a result of the able and highly pro-
fessional assistance we receive from the functional divisions of the De-
partment of Justice and from the other departments and agencies involved.
Because of the thorough work that is done by these offices and the careful
review and rewriting by my own staff, which all these matters receive before
being placed on my desk, I have been able to continue the important
practice of my predecessors of personally passing upon every one of the
2000-plus substantive matters that must be resolved by my office. This
is something like eight a day for every working day in the year, and it
keeps a lawyer busy. Some of it is routine. Much of it is fascinatingly
interesting.
The range of problems we confront is a vivid lesson in the breadth of
activities which involve the government. A substantial portion of our work
includes, of course, federal criminal prosecutions, many of which appear
on the Court's Miscellaneous Docket, where indigents are granted leave
to proceed without prepayment of costs. But every year we handle several
major antitrust cases, a heavy volume of tort claims and federal employee
grievance cases, scores of cases covering the federal tax code, and large
numbers of administrative agencies cases.
The contrasts in the nature and significance of the issues are striking.
Considerable agility is required for shifting intellectual gears from, for
example, a criminal case in which the issues are the lawfulness of a search
[Vol. 34
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and the admissibility of declarations against penal interest, to a Labor
Board case probing the limits of a union's power to discipline its members.
The point may be illustrated in another way. While the dollars-and-cents
amount in suit is not always a reliable index of the signifiance of a partic-
ular case-Flast v. Cohen,17 last Term, could be cited for that proposition-
a comparison of two very recent cases will mark the extremes. On the third
of March, the Court decided United States v. Louisiana,8 involving the
question how and where the boundary should be drawn between off-shore
lands owned by Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico and those owned by the
United States. Justice Black, in his dissent, stated that he was dismayed
that the United States had insisted on claiming the disputed tracts, since
a comparison of the acreage at issue with the federal government's other
land holdings showed the controversy was over infinitesimal plots. But be-
neath those relatively small areas lies untold wealth in oil-whose value
cannot accurately be predicted but is variously estimated at between several
billion and one trillion dollars. There is already over a billion dollars held
in the Federal Treasury awaiting the ultimate outcome of the case.
On February 24, one week before, the Court refused to grant certiorari
in a case where we opposed further review, a case where the ad damnum
clause claimed 3 cents-with no hidden millions lurking in the background1 0
The case involved an addressee who had been sent a special delivery letter
on which there was insufficient postage. In order to obtain the letter, the
addressee paid the 8 cents postage due, protesting that the letter had not
received special delivery service because it was held at the post office on
account of the postage due. He brought suit against the local postmaster,
demanding a refund of three cents; he believed the principle involved-
that's "* * *-p.l.e." not the principal, "* * * *-p.a.l."-to be so important
that he carried the case to the Supreme Court. Though he proceeded pro se
his pleadings were printed in accordance with the Rules, no doubt costing
him hundreds of dollars, and he paid the $100 docketing fee to have the
case placed on the Appellate Docket.
IV. COMPARISON wrrH NON-GOVERNMENT LAw OFFIcEs
Most lawyers work hard, and many have the good fortune to be ex-
posed to a variety of legal problems. The Office of the Solicitor General is
not unique in those regards, although I believe the range of issues we con-
17. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
18. 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
19. Hughes v. Gengler, 393 U.S. 1085 (1969).
1969]
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front far exceeds anything a private practitioner, or even another govern-
ment lawyer, encounters. But I would like to turn now to some of the
characteristics of our professional endeavors that may fairly be termed
unique. The differences are several, but they all derive from the principal
official responsibility of this office, which is the representation of the United
States before the Supreme Court. Flowing from this high professional duty
are several consequences. First, and most obvious, is that the Solicitor
General and his staff appear with unrivaled frequency before the highest
court in the land. Last Term, for example, the government appeared in 115
cases argued on the merits before the Supreme Court, which means that
we were involved in nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of all the cases the
Court heard on the merits. 20
One of the corollaries of this regular-but never routine-opportunity
to appear before the Court is an institutional one which can never be over-
looked. When the Solicitor General or a member of his staff stands before
the Court, it is not as an individual lawyer representing a particular client
whose immediate and personal interests are sub judice. He is there, rather,
as a part of an institutional relationship of a continuing nature. In de-
termining the legal position to be advanced and in framing his argument,
his effort cannot focus simply on success in the particular case. Instead, he
must make a rather difficult judgment: What should he ask the Court
to decide; how much ought he to prevail upon; what will be the effect
of a particular position or decision in this case, not only upon the govern-
ment's interests, narrowly considered, but upon the values and principles
that underlie and animate our system and upon the development of the
law in general. These are considerations which rarely enter into the pro-
fessional processes of private litigation, but they are factors which must
always be carefully considered by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Perhaps a few figures from last Term will mark the quantitative con-
sequences of the special screening-I could almost say "objectivity"-
that a case is subjected to before the Solicitor General expresses the gov-
ernment's view on it before the Court. During the 1967 Term, only nine
per cent of the petitions for writs of certiorari not filed or supported by
the government were granted; but where the United States either filed the
petition, or 9upported it as amicus curiae, the petition was granted in 65
per cent of the cases.21 And in those cases involving the government which
20. 1968 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP., Table X 102.
21. 1968 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP., Table IX 99.
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were decided by the Court on the merits-brought there either on our
initiative or over our opposition-nearly twice as often the Court decided
in favor of the government's position as it did against us.22
These figures are not cited to show any special prowess on the part of
the Solicitor General in presenting cases to the Court. They illustrate,
rather, the success of our policy of pruning from the cases lost in the
courts of appeals the decisions that properly went against us or that, even
if believed in error, are not of general significance. Less than one case
in ten lost in the court of appeals becomes the subject of a government
certiorari petition (36 out of 379 last term). Whether the Court con-
sciously considers that the Solicitor General has himself "discounted" the
case before determining to seek review is a matter some commentators
might speculate about. I prefer to believe that our record in having
certiorari granted comes from the objective soundness of our assessment
that the case is, in the jargon of our highly specialized trade, "certworthy."
Premised on the same foundation as this screening process is the
peculiar ambivalence of the function we must fill as lawyers. We are lawyers,
representing a client; we are also, in a special sense, officers of the Court.
The Solicitor General has a special obligation to aid the Court as well as
to serve his client. Moreover, since his client is always the United States
government or its officers or agencies, the loyalties are not as easily de-
fined as they generally are in private practice. The Solicitor General's
client in a particular case cannot be properly represented before the
Supreme Court except from a broad point of view, taking into account all
of the factors which affect sound government and the proper formulation
and development of the law. In providing for the Solicitor General, subject
to the direction of the Attorney General, to attend to the "interests of the
United States" in litigation,23 the statutes have always been understood
to mean the long-range interests of the United States, not simply in terms
of its fisc, or its success in the particular litigation, but as a government,
as a people. Occasionally, the Solicitor General finds it necessary to "confess
error," when he concludes that he cannot defend a judgment in favor of
the government. His authority to do this derives from the statutes to
which I have referred, coupled with the traditions which have been es-
tablished for the office by a long line of distinguished Solicitors General.
This authority is, of course, sparingly exercised. Confessing error is
a little bit like taking medicine: its basic purpose and ultimate effect are
22. Id., Table X 102.
23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 517, 518 (1966 Supp).
1969]
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highly salubrious, but it may have a bitter taste for a moment going down.
Judge Simon Sobeloff, who is a former Solicitor General, and now a dis-
tinguished circuit judge, is quoted as saying:
When I was Solicitor General, I thought that confessing error was
the noblest function of the office. Now that I am a Circuit Judge, I
know it is the lowest trick one lawyer can play on another.2 4
Other circuit judges who, at the urging of the government in their court,
have delivered an opinion which the Solicitor General refused to defend,
sometimes react somewhat more vigorously, I may add.
I would like to point out just one more area in which the Solicitor
General's Office diverges from private practice in a meaningful way, and
that is in our occasional appearance as amicus curiae. I have tried to hold
down the number of these briefs-but it is not easy. There are a considerable
number of cases in which the Court requests the government's views, and
there are other cases in which the government has a vital interest in the
outcome-such as the "stop and frisk" cases of last year, for example. This
is, perhaps, the situation where the Solicitor General's role most differs
from a private lawyer's-when the issue is one of such public importance
that his "client," the United States, should present the best legal argu-
ment it can muster. Over the years, the United States has played an
active part as amicus curiae on such vital public issues as civil rights, re-
apportionment, aid to education, and standards of criminal justice. Last
Term, for example, the United States appeared amicus curiae in 19 cases
argued on the merits in the Supreme Court.2 5 I think we contributed some-
thing to the balanced and informed adjudication of those cases.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion has, of necessity, given only a superficial view of the
practice of the Solicitor General's office. There is room for statesmanship
and we try to exercise that role in appropriate cases. But essentially, we
are advocates, doing our best to present the legal arguments for our great
client before the judicial tribunal which our Constitution has put first
in the land. We do not decide the cases, but we do have to exercise a lawyer's
choice and judgment as to the arguments we make. That, as I see it, is
lawyering. If it occasionally involves a little statesmanship, that, too, is
sometimes the proper function of a lawyer.
24. Quoted by Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. B. RE.c.
221, 225 (1963).
25. 1968 A'rr'y GEN. ANN. REP., Table X 102.
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